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Free Trade
with l\1exiLu?
The U.s., Mexico, and Canada are planning
negotiations on a regional North American Free
Trade Agreement (FTA) this summer. The pro-
posed FTA would join the U.S. with its first- and
third- largest trading partners, which account for
roughly 25 percent of total u.s. trade. The North
American market would have a combined output
similar to that of the European Community (over
$6 trillion) but a larger population (365 million,
compared to 330 million in Europe).
The rationale for free trade between the U.S. and
Canada has been discussed in an earlier Weekiy
Letter (February 10, 1989). This Letter examines
why the u.s. and Mexico are pursuing an FTA,
its potential scope, the expected effects on the
U.S. economy, and some concerns expressed
on the u.s. side.
Why an FTA with Mexico?
The U.S. is pursuing trade liberalizationon
several fronts. Although the latest round of global
trade negotiations did not achieve an accord last
year, efforts are underway to revive these talks. At
the same time, the U.S. is pursuing a broad strat-
egy of liberalizing trade in the Americas, and an
FTA with Mexico is an important element of this
effort. In addition to the 1989 U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement, other u.s. efforts include the
1983 Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), which
exempts certain exports of Caribbean economies
from u.s. trade barriers, and the proposed
"Andean Trade Preferences Act of 1990" which
would grant Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and
Bolivia benefits similar to those of CBI. More
generally, President Bush's "Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative" ofJune 1990 called for the
long-run establishment of a free trade zone in the
Americas. An FTA between the U.S. and Mexico
is a natural step in the direction of regional free
trade because of already low tariffs and the ex-
tensive trade links between the two economies.
From the Mexican perspective, an FTA with the
U.S. would consolidate the extensive economic
reforms (trade liberalization, privatization, reduc-
tion of budget deficits) Mexico has undertaken
since the mid-1980s. It also would help Mexico
achieve two economic objectives. First, an FTA
could offset a disturbing increase in Mexican
trade deficits apparent since 1989, which re-
sulted from booming imports and lagging export
revenues. Improvements in Mexico's external
balance are needed to cope with its still substan-
tial external debt of about $80 billion. Second, it
could stimulate large increases in direct foreign
investment in Mexico, which, in the short run,
would also heip Mexico service its external debt.
But there are important long~run eff~cts as well,
At present foreign investment in Mexico is con-
centrated in the export enclaves (maquiladoras)
along the U.S.-Mexican border, which are rela-
tively isolated from the rest of the Mexican econ-
omy. By encouraging investment elsewhere in
Mexico, the FTAwould deepen Mexico's indus-
trial infrastructure and increase its efficiency.
Scope
The U.s.-Mexico FTA negotiations are likely to
extend well beyond the liberalization oftrade
barriers (though not nearly so far as the economic
integration envisioned for Europe in 1992). In
particular, a number of outstanding topics that
have been the subject of recent trade negotia-
tions between the u.s. and Mexico may be dis-
cussed. Some ofthese outstanding topics are
examined in the latest report of the u.s. Trade
Representative (1991).
Tariff barriers. Tariff barriers between the two
economies are relatively low. The overall U.S.
weighted average tariff rate on Mexican products
is about 3.8 percent. As a result ofextensive tariff
reforms in the 1980s, Mexican tariffs on u.s.
products are estimated to average 6.2 percent
(lower than Canadian tariffs at the start of the
U.S.-Canada free-trade negotiations). An FTA
could reduce U.S. and Mexican tariffs on certain
agricultural and manufactured goods which are
currently much higher than these averages (tariffFRBSF
rates on some of these products are as a high as
20 percent).
Nontariff barriers. An FTAcouldreduce or
eliminate U.S. nontarjffbarriers on imports of
textiles and apparel, agricultural products, and
steel. Mexico's import licensing scheme could be
further liberalized (this scheme still covered 210
product categories in late 1990 compared to 820
items in 1986). Particular attention may be given
to easing Mexican import restrictions on auto-
mobiles and some agricultural products (such as
apples, grapes, peaches, raisins, poultry, corn,
and wheat). The Mexican government may also
be called on to end discriminatory procurement
practices that limit the import content of govern-
ment purchases.
Foreign investment. An FTA could result in
reforms to Mexico's foreign investment policies
so that U.S. investors in l\1exico vvould operate
under the same set of rules governing Mexican
nationals. This VVQuld greatly benefit U.S. inves-
tors, who account for nearly two-thirds of the
authorized foreign investment in Mexico. More
specifically, FTA negotiations may seek to relax
prohibitions or restrictions on foreign ownership
in 14.1 Mexican economic sectors. The opening
of the Mexican energy sector, which badly needs
infusions of capital and technology, would be of
particular interest to U.s. investors. Foreign in-
vestment in Mexico's energy sector is banned by
the Mexican constitution, however, which makes
liberalization in this area particularly difficult.
Other areas include mining, transportation
equipment, auto parts, transportation, and most
financial activities. Mexican performance re-
quirements for u.s. investments may also be
reduced or eliminated (they are banned in the
U.s.-Canada pact). For example, U.S. investors
in the Mexican automobile sector traditionally
had to meet strict local content requirements as
a condition for producing in Mexico. U.S. inves-
tors also had to ensure that theforeign currency
revenues of their automobile production facilities
were sufficiently large to cover import costs.
Intellectual property. FTA negotiations may seek
to enhance the intellectual property protection
offered in Mexico. Mexican patent protection is
not planned for chemicals, pharmaceuticals, al-
loys, and foods until 1997, and no patent protec-
tion at all is being considered for biotechnologies.
The U.S. is seeking 20-year terms of protection
(compared to 14 years at present), broader prod-
uct coverage, protection for trade secrets and
trademarks, improved enforcement of trade se-
cret protection, and a shift in the burden of proof
to the alleged infringer in process patent·cases.
Effects on the U.S.
The welfare effects of an FTA with Mexico are
difficult to estimate for both theoretical and
practical reasons. On the one hand, the reduc-
tion in tariff and nontariff barriers that may result
from an FTA with Mexico is expected to increase
the efficiency of U.s. producers by encouraging
them to specialize in those sectors where they
enjoy a comparative advantage. An FTA with
Mexico also may permit U.s. firms to reap the
benefits of economies of scale that are likely to
be associated with a larger combined market.
These gains would enhance the ability of u.s.
firms to compete with firms based in an inte-
grated European market as vvell as to meet the
continuing competitive challenge of producers
in Asia and the developing world. On the other
hand, lowering trade barriers with Mexico under
an FTA, while leaving trade barriers against the
rest of the world unchanged, may encourage the
u.s. to import from Mexico even if Mexico is a
higher-cost producer.
Several recent studies have attempted to resolve
some of the uncertainty about the FTA's impact
by developing models that estimate the aggregate
and sectoral effects of bilateral trade liberaliza-
tion on the u.s. and Mexican economies. At the
aggregate level, these studies suggest that an FTA
with Mexico will raise U.s. real income, wages
or employment, and returns on capital. While no
definitive conclusions can be drawn about the
effects on U.S. welfare, these results suggest that
an FTA with Mexico may, on balance, benefit the
u.s. However, the estimated benefits are very
small, for two reasons. First,the U.s. economy is
about 27 times the size of the Mexican economy.
Second, the studies focus mainly on the effects
of the reduction of trade barriers that are already
quite low between the two economies.
Although aggregate effects may be small, an FTA
with Mexico is likely to have significant effects
on certain sectors ofthe u.s. economy.
In agriculture and related industries, U.S. farmers
who grow grain and oilseeds, such as soybeans,
could see increases in output. These crops arerelatively capital-intensive, and Mexico's pro-
ducers cannot meet their own domestic demand.
Other u.s. agriculture-related production may be
adversely affected, notably sugar refining, fruits
and vegetables, tobacco manufactures, lumber,
and wood. These are sectors where Mexico may
enjoy a comparative advantage due to lower la-
bor costs or greater resource endowments. The
most detailed study (KPMG Peat Marwick 1991)
estimates declines ranging from 0.1 to 3.9
percent.
In manufacturing, output gains are likely in
U.S. industries that are technology-intensive or
capital-intensive, such as optical instruments
and miscellaneous manufactures, machinery and
equipment, chemicals, plastics, and iron and
steel. Output declines are expected in more
labor-intensive U.S. industries, such as electronic
components, textiles and apparel, and furniture
and fixtures. In all these cases, the estimated ef-
fect is small, 1.2 percent or less for gainers, 1.0
percent or less for losers. The impact of an FTA
on the automobile sector, of great concern both
in the U.S. and Mexico, is uncertain. On the one
hand, current Mexican trade restrictions have led
to overinvestment in Mexican automobile man-
ufacturing capacity, which suggests that trade
liberalization may increase U.s. auto production
and exports to Mexico. On the other hand, the
International Trade Commission reports that late
last year, U.S. automakers estimated that they
could increase profit margins by 4 to 10 percent
by producing in Mexico if an FTA leads to liber-
alized investment rules south ofthe border.
Concerns
The major concern on the u.s. side is that u.s.
manufacturing will migrate to Mexico because of
lower wages and lower environmental standards,
at the expense of U.S. workers. Unskilled workers
in the u.s. are seen as being particularly at risk,
as labor costs in Mexico are estimated to be
about 10 percent of those in the United States.
In response, supporters of the FTA point out that
less efficient manufacturing facilities will move
out of the u.s. anyway, and that it is better for
the u.s. that they move to Mexico than to other
developing economies. Mexico spends a much
larger proportion of its export revenue in the
u.s. than do many other economies (the u.s.
accounts for nearly 70 percent of Mexican
imports), and economic stability in Mexico re-
sulting from u.s. investment may stem the tide
of illegal Mexican immigration into the U.S.
FTA supporters also argue that the U.S. will not
necessarily "lose jobs" from its trade with Mex-
ico, as the expansion of U.s.-Mexican trade will
stimulate U.S. exports, as well as employment.
Some recent studies estimate that an FTA with
Mexico either would have no discernible effects
on aggregate u.s. employment or may even in-
crease U.s. employment by a limited amount.
While these results are encouraging, they should
be interpreted with some caution, as studies to
date have focused mainly on the effects of lower-
ing trade barriers under an FTA. More research is
needed to determine the potential effects on U.S.
manufacturing of a comprehensive liberalization
in Mexico's foreign investment policy. Aside from
providing better estimates of aggregate effects,
such research might also clarify the effects of a
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